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PREVAILING WAGE PROVISION

N.Y CONST. art. I, § 17:
Labor of human beings is not a commodity nor an articleof
commerce and shall never be so considered or construed. No
laborer, workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or
subcontractor engaged in the performance of any public
work... shall... be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in
the same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where
such public work is to be situated,erected or used.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Brukhman v. Giuliani'
(decided February 22, 2000)
Plaintiffs, public assistance recipients, who were required
by the New York City Department of Social Services to participate
in a Work Experience Program (hereinafter "WEP"), brought suit
against the City of' New York claiming that the prevailing wage
provision of the New York State Constitution should be used to
calculate their pay rate. 2 The Supreme Court of New York agreed
with the plaintiffs, and held that the recipients were entitled to have
their hours measured by applying a comparable rate of pay for
individuals engaged in the same or similar positions by the same
employer, or at a similar site.3 The Appellate Division reversed
the lower court, holding that the recipients did not fall within the
ambit of the state constitution's prevailing wage provision.4 The
court also held that paying the minimum wage to WEP participants
instead of the prevailing wage did not violate equal protection,
because a rational distinction existed between the participants and
civil service employees for which the statute was written.5 The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's

'94 N.Y.2d 387, 727 NE.2d 116 (2000).
2id.
3 Brukhnan v. Giuliani, 174 Misc. 2d 26, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1997).
4 Brukhman v. Giuliani, 253 A.D.2d 653, 678 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1st Dep't 1998).
5
Id.
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holding.6 The Court concluded that the prevailing wage provision
of the New York State Constitution 7 did not apply to public
assistance beneficiaries who are statutorily required to participate8
in a WEP as a condition of continued receipt of monetary grants.
Moreover, the Court determined that the computation system
created by New York Social Services Law § 336-c 9 was
constitutional as applied.' 0
Under welfare reform legislation, recipients of Aid to
Dependent Children and Home relief were given work assignments
11
to continually perform as a condition of receiving their money.
Placements ranged from not-for-profit organizations to New York
City agencies.' Various jobs were offered through the program
3
ranging from skilled electrical work to office clerical functions.'
In order to determine the hours that a WEP participant was
required to work, the City divided the benefits that a participant
14
received by the federal minimum wage or the prevailing wage.
The plaintiffs claimed that the manner in which the City calculated
their hours was unconstitutional, arguing that they fell within the
ambit of the prevailing wage provision of Article I, Section 17 of
the New York State Constitution, therefore making
the receipt of
5
inadequate.'
work
their
for
wage
federal minimum
Plaintiffs relied on New York Social Services Law Sections
164 and 336-c to support their argument. 16 However, the New
6id.
7N.Y. CONST. art. I,

§ 17 states:

Labor of human beings is not a commodity nor an article of
commerce and shall never be so considered or construed. No laborer,
workman or mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor
engaged in the performance of any public work... shall ... be paid
less than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade or occupation
in the locality within the state where such public work is to be
situated, erected or used. Id.
8 Brukhman, 94 N.Y.2d 387, 727 N.E.2d 116, 705 N.Y.S.2d 558.
9N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW

§ 336-c (Consol. 1997).

1oBrukhman, 94 N.Y.2d 387, 727 N.E.2d 116, 705 N.Y.S.2d 558.
"Id. at 391, 727 N.E.2d at 120, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
12 id.
"3Id. at 392, 727 N.E.2d at 121, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
14 Brukhman, 94 N.Y.2d at 391, 727 N.E.2d at 120, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
15id.
16 id.
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York State Legislature repealed Section 16417 and amended
Section 336-c of the Social Services Law
Section 336-c.1
currently states that the hours which are required of WEP
participants to work are to be calculated by dividing the amount of
benefits that the participants receive by the higher of the state or
the
federal minimum wage. 19 The prevailing wage standard of
20
amendment.
the
in
mentioned
not
was
New York Constitution
Plaintiffs' main argument was that they were engaged in
'public work' within the meaning of the constitutional provision on
prevailing wages. 21 The defendants countered by stating that the
prevailing wage provision as articulated in Article I, Section 17 of
the New York State Constitution was intended to be very limited in
scope, and therefore did not apply to the plaintiffs. 22 The New
York State Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants, holding
that the provision is very narrow and only covers employees of
contractors and subcontractors engaged in the performance of
not fit within the provision
public work.23 Hence, the plaintiffs 2did
4
as it was intended by the legislature.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw. § 164 (Consol. 1992). Prior to its repeal, this law
governed WEP participants who received Home Relief. In pertinent part it
stated, "[tihe social services official of a county, city or town which is
responsible for providing home relief shall provide for the establishment of
public work projects for the assignment of employable persons in receipt of
home relief. .. ." See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 174 Misc. 2d at 35, 662 N.Y.S.2d
at 919.
18 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 336-c (Consol. 1997). Prior to its amendment, the
law stated:
A recipient may be assigned to participate in such work experience
program only if:... (b) the number of hours that any such person
may be required to work in any month does not exceed a number
which equals the amount of assistance payable . . .divided by the
higher of (1) the federal minimum wage, or (2) the state minimum
wage, or (3) the rate of pay for persons employed in the same or
similar occupations by the same employer at the same or equivalent
site.
17

20/d.
21

22
23

Id. at 394, 727 N.E.2d at 123, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395, 727 N.E.2d at 124, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
The Record of the 1938 Constitutional Convention of the State of
New York is replete with references that limit the breadth of the

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [2000], Art. 13

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 17

In deciding the case at bar, the Court relied heavily upon
it's previous decision in Corrigan v. Joseph.25 In Corrigan, the
Court of Appeals held that municipal employees in graded civil
service positions could not use the prevailing-rate-of-wages
formula to fix their wages. 26 In holding that the petitioners could
not have invoked the prevailing wage provision of the New York
State Constitution,
the Court confirmed the limited scope of the
27
provision.
The constitutional provision only covered employees of "a
contractor or subcontractor engaged in the performance of any
public work. 28 The appellants in Corrigan conceded that they
were not "in the employ of a 'contractor or subcontractor engaged
in the performance of any public work"'; nevertheless, they
contended that the constitutional provision covered them because
of the mere fact that they were engaged in public work.29 The
Court concluded that the language of the provision was clear, and
intended to cover only those "employed by a contractor or
prevailing wage provision. To be sure, the protection of a prevailing
wage for 'public works contracts' represented 'one of the major
achievements of organized labor which it desires reduced to a
constitutional guarantee,' as well as ' the public policy of this State.

Id.
24 Id.

25 304 N.Y. 172, 106 N.E.2d 593 (1952).
26

Id. The appellants were employees of the Board of Transportation of the City

of New York. Their employment responsibilities included maintenance and
repair of facilities of the municipally owned subway, surface and elevated
railway lines. Prior to 1938, appellants were in ungraded civil service positions.
Thereafter a resolution was passed, which reclassified their positions into graded
service jobs. The Rapid Transit Railroad Service authorized the maximum and
minimum compensation of the grades to be established by the Board of
Transportation. An investigation into § 220 of the New York Labor Law ensued
to determine if this practice was constitutional. Id.
27 Id. at 179.
That the intended scope of the provision was thus definitely limited is
clearly indicated by the following statement made on the floor of the
Constitutional Convention of 1938 by a delegate... 'This
amendment reads as follows,... No laborer, workman or mechanic
in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor. Now these words are
vital. Unless the laborer, workman or mechanic is in the employ of a
contractor or subcontractor it'does not apply. Id.
28 Id.
29 id.
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30
subcontractor engaged in the performance of any public work.,
Therefore, the fact that the graded civil service employees engaged
solely in public
work was insufficient to trigger the protections of
3
the provision. 1
In the instant case, the Court was not persuaded by the
plaintiffs' argument that they should be considered "in the employ
of' the different agencies where they were assigned.32 The Court
stated that a department of a municipality did not qualify as a
"contractor or subcontractor" as defined under the prevailing wage
provision. 33 Although a department entered into agreements with
the municipality and provided positions for a WEP participant,
it
4
subcontractor.
or
contractor
did not act as the municipality's
In addition, the Court added that the WEP participants were
not "in the employ of' any employer. 35 The participants were
placed in their positions to fulfill a requirement necessary for the
continuation of their welfare benefits. Moreover, since the
positions that the WEP participants obtained were temporary, 36 and
the agencies did not pay 37
their salaries, they were not employed by
their respective agencies.
In concluding that the plaintiffs were not engaged in
"public work," the Court of Appeals followed Varsity Transit, Inc.
v. Saporita.38 The Varsity court stated, "it is hombook law that the
Labor Law provision only applies to workers involved in the
construction, replacement, maintenance and repair of 'public
works' in a legally restricted sense of that term."39 Although
Article I, Section 17 of the New York State Constitution extended

Id.
id.
32
Brukhman, 94 N.Y.2d at 395, 727 N.E.2d at 127, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
33 Id.
30

31

34
3
36

id.
Id. at 394, 727 N.E.2d at 124, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 565.

Id. at 396, 727 N.E.2d at 126, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 567. "The program's manual

states that 'participants are expected to seek paid employment' participants are
'assigned' to various 'worksite[s] where they provide valuable service' until
they
are able 'to secure employment in the regular economy."' Id.
37
Brukhman, 94 N.Y.2d at 396, 727 N.E.2d at 126, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (paying
a salary is one of the main requirements that triggers the prevailing wage

provision).
8
71 A.D.2d 643, N.Y.S.2d 667 (1st Dep't 1979).
39
Id. at 644, N.Y.S.2d at 668.
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the protection of Section 220 of the Labor Law to contractors and
it was not intended to
subcontractors engaged in "public works,"
40
expand the definition of "public works."
41
In the Matter of Twin State CCS Corporation.v. Roberts
clarified how to determine what constitutes "public work." The
Court stated that the focus should be on "the purpose or function of
the project. ' ' 2 In Twin, the Court found that the installation of a
telecommunications system into a public building, which would be
used b2 public employees, satisfied the definition of "public
work." 3 Moreover, the installation required a degree of
"construction-like" labor which was precisely what the prevailing
44
wage provision was intended to cover.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs attempted to convince the
Court that the term "public work," as used in the New York State
Constitution, should be given an elastic interpretation.45 The Court
was not persuaded, and referred to the debate record from the New
York State Constitutional Convention to clarify the meaning of
"public work.",4 6 The Court found it to be inconsistent that the
work which the WEP participants engaged in was "public work,"
because the participants
were not employees of the agencies where
4?
placed.
they were
With regard to plaintiffs' equal protection claim, they
argued that New York's Social Security Law 336-c discriminated
against them as a class because it authorized that the manner in
which they should have been paid was the higher of the federal or
state minimum wage. 48 The Court concluded that a rational
distinction existed between public employees selected from civil
service lists, and WEP participants who received their assignments

40

id.

4'72
42

N.Y.2d 897, 528 N.E.2d 1219, 532 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1988).
Id. at 899, 528 N.E.2d at 1220, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 748.

43

Id.

44Id.

Brukhman, 94 N.Y.2d at 393, 727 N.E.2d at 733, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
Id. "The expectations of 'public work' . . . are specifically and intentionally
related to construction projects, rather than general services: 'Constructing a
VTublic
building in the State of New York."' Id.
7
Id.
48 Id. at 392, 727 N.E.2d at 732, 705 N.Y.S. at 562.
45

46
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as a condition to their continued receipt of financial assistance.
The Court did not provide further analysis.49
The Federal Constitution does not contain a provisional
counterpart to the New York State Constitution regarding
prevailing wages. Finally, the New York Court of Appeals did not
address the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, since the equal
protection clauses of the Federal 5° and New York State
Constitutions 51 contain similar language and provide similar
constitutional guarantees.
Michele Molfetta

49

Id.

50

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent

part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States... nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
5l N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 11. This section provides: "No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No
person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by firm, corporation, or
institution, or by the siate or any agency or subdivision of the state." Id.
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